The Syrian situation has taken some rather interesting turns in the last 72 hours. The pressure on the Assad regime has become quite obvious; nonetheless, it continues to hold on to power. So what options are available to Western policymakers?
The need to protect the civilian populations being targeted by Syrian regime forces has become obvious. In this respect, the need to protect (or as is more commonly known, the responsibility to protect, or R2P) cannot be denied. Where things have become sticky for the United States and its allies is how to provide such protection.
One of the problems that faces any Western attempt to protect the Syrian population is that a similar undertaking in Libya was clearly exploited to overthrow the regime of Mommar Gaddafi. This is a point that the Russian and Chinese governments clearly continue to carry a sense of irritation (if not more than that), and which would provide a means by which any attempted action against the Syrian regime would be blocked in the U.N. Security Council. However, the risks for nonintervention are very clear in terms of fostering an unstable situation within Syria itself.
One alternative offered by Andrew Kydd would set up a mechanism whereby assets used by the Syrain regime would be systematically targeted for every attack upon the civilian population. This policy, however, comes across more like the failed actions by the U.N. in Bosnia, where each attack by the Bosnian Serb forces upon civilian populations was answered by an attack upon a specific target. This policy failed due to the inability of the U.N. forces to precisely target a given Bosnian Serb weapon, and due to the fact that a tit-for-tat strategy does not provide for the sort of pain level that would cause an aggressor to reconsider their policy.
Reed M. Wood provides a cautionary note as to the utility of military intervention. Wood notes that unless such an intervention is impartial in nature, it will be bound to create a situation where surges in violence inevitably occur, since the side in the internal conflict seen as the “winner” will seek to wreak vengeance against the perceived “losers” in the conflict. While setting up an impartial intervention may sound appealing in theory, the problem is in actually setting up such an intervention. How, for example, would one deal with the Assad regime and its support structures? Wood insists that such an intervention should have as one of its goals “establishing the conditions that allow both sides to commit to peace.” The major problem in this equation is that there is no sign by the Assad regime that it is willing to compromise with the forces it considers “terrorists.” In addition, given the actions of the Assad regime in its dealings with “hostile” populations, there is a considerable disincentive on the part of the Syrian opposition to take the assurances of the Assad regime at face value, even with the assurance of protection by the international community. The opposition could easily claim that even with international forces in place in Bosnia, atrocities against the civilian population continued to occur.
The key factor in any possible intervention, therefore, is not just to protect vulnerable civilian populations, but to also alter the behavior of the actors involved — particularly the Assad regime. The problem in achieving this end is that, unless there is a dramatic change in the situation on the ground, the only possible policy to achieve this end is to topple the Assad regime, and to accept the consequences (most particularly, massive levels of violence and instability) that would be the consequence of such an action. In addition, the clear support by Russia and China of the Syrian regime would generally proclude such an action, even if it could be mounted in the near future. Therefore, the United States and its allies are faced with a situation that allows for bad options, and worse options.
Or is there a feasible way that this situation could actually be resolved?
Kedalion's Quest 
Another option available to Western policymakers is to pay close attention to what IS happening within someone else’s sovereign state and exercise considerable constraint in efforts aimed at intervention.
“The need to protect civilian populations” fails to differentiate between the minority Alawite community and the majority Sunni population, who for centuries, tormented the minority. Since when is this protection obvious? This particular situation of instability became obvious shortly after President Wilson set forth his “mandates” nearly one hundred years ago.
How will toppling the Assad regime serve to control the irregular militia forces perpetrating the majority of the anti Sunni pogroms? Controlling the regular military, comprised primarily of Alawites, will be nearly impossible with Assad out of the political picture. These forces, with their training and weaponry intact, will likely join with the irregular forces and continue to retaliate against their Sunni tormentors.
The use of the Balkans and Libyan examples is understandable so let us pursue yet another. On April 19, 2003, US and coalition forces intervened in Iraq for two very specific reasons. On June 11, 2004, Saddam Hussein’s FBI interogator team discovered that initial US reasoning was seriously flawed – there were no WMDs and there were no al Qaeda ties.
Prior to determining feasibiity of intervention, let us hope someone with considerable skill in associational analysis steps up before those displaying only skills in causal analysis create more havoc!
All excellent points, which is why I would suggest that the need for a careful analysis of the situation is not only necessary, but indeed crucial. The frictions between the various communities within Syria — and let us not forget the grievances that the Kurdish and Druze communities also harbor — make the need for some form of transitional structure an absolute necessity. What needs to be determined is to what extent Bashar al-Assad can ever be a part of such an arrangement, given his actions over the last 15 months or so.